Age Discrimination before the ECJ - Conceptual and Theoretical issues by Schiek, DG
promoting access to White Rose research papers 
   
White Rose Research Online 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: 
 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/76331/ 
 
 
 
 
Paper: 
 
Schiek, DG (2011) Age Discrimination before the ECJ - Conceptual and 
Theoretical issues. Common Market Law Review, 48 (3). 777 - 799 (22). 
 
 
Age discrimination 777Common Market Law Review 48: 777–799, 2011.
© 2011 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
AGE DISCRIMINATION BEFORE THE ECJ – CONCEPTUAL AND 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
DAGMAR SCHIEK*
1. Introduction
Since EU law first addressed age discrimination through Directive 2000/78/
EC, due for implementation in 2003 (with the possibility of extension to 2006), 
case law on this particular ground has been mushrooming. The ECJ data base 
already shows 12 cases on age discrimination, 1 of which eight were heard by 
the Court’s Grand Chamber,2 and six more cases are pending. 3 This seems a 
high number for a relatively short period of time if compared to other discrimi-
nation grounds. The first case on sex equality was brought 23 years after the 
equal pay clause was included in the Treaty of Rome in 1957,4 and also the 
other discrimination grounds contained in Article 19 TFEU are less relevant 
before the Court.5 This apparent popularity of age discrimination resonates 
with the fact that this form of discrimination is expected by everyone, rather 
* Chair in European Law, University of Leeds, Centre of European Law and Legal Studies 
(<www.law.leeds.ac.uk/european>). I would like to thank my colleague Anna Lawson and the 
anonymous referees of the CML Rev. for valuable hints to enhance this piece. The usual disclai-
mer applies.
1. Cases C-144/05, Mangold, [2005] ECR I-9981; C-227/04 P, Lindorfer, [2007] ECR 
I-6767; C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa, [2007] ECR I-8531; C-388/07, Age Concern England, 
[2009] I-1569; C-341/08, Petersen, judgment of 12 Jan. 2010, nyr; C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, 
judgment of 19 Jan. 2010, nyr; C-246/09, Bulicke, judgment of 8 July 2010, nyr; C-88/08, Hüt-
ter, judgment of 18 June 2010, nyr; C-449/08, Andersen, judgment of 12 Oct. 2010, nyr; C-45/09, 
Rosenbladt, judgment of 12 Oct. 2010, nyr; C-250/09, Georgiev, judgment of 18 Nov. 2010, nyr; 
and C-229/08, Wolf, judgment of 1 Dec. 2010, nyr
2. Mangold, Lindorfer, Palacios de la Villa, Bartsch, Petersen, Kücükdeveci, Andersen, 
Rosenbladt and Wolf, cited supra note 1.
3. Case C-447/09, Prigge et al.; Case C-86/10, Balaban; Case C-159/10, Fuchs; Case 
C-160/10, Köhler; Case C-297/10, Mai; and Case C-298/10, Henning; all pending.
4. Case 80/70, Defrenne I, [1971] ECR 445.
5. E.g. so far the Court has only heard one case involving substantive issues of race discrim-
ination at national level (C-54/07, Feryn, [2008] ECR I-5187) and two cases involving substan-
tive issues of disability discrimination (C-13/05, Chacon Navas, [2006] ECR I-6467, and 
C-303/06, Coleman, [2008] ECR I-5603), notwithstanding a number of infringement procedures 
concerning implementation of Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC and a few staff cases 
involving discrimination on racial and ethnic origin. 
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than only suffered by a part of the population. 6 Accordingly, prohibiting age 
discrimination has the rumoured capacity to bring non-disabled, heterosexual 
white men into the fold of discrimination law lobbyists.7 As if aspiring to cre-
ate as many beneficiaries as possible, EU law prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of any age, rather than only addressing discrimination against people 
above a certain age (as in the US). .8 However, so far age discrimination is only 
addressed in the employment context (Art. 3 Directive 2000/78/EC).9
 In this field especially, different treatment on grounds of age is very com-
mon, as witnessed by the widespread use of minimum age requirements for 
certain occupations, maximum age limits for certain employment related ben-
efits and incremental increases of wages through a number of age bands. Con-
sequently, even those defending age equality in principle admit that a wider 
range of justifications for different treatment on grounds of age may be avail-
able than in relation to grounds such as sex or race. 10 
The rationale of prohibiting age discrimination is accordingly contested. It 
oscillates between reasons related to employment policy on the one hand and 
reasons stemming from the general rationale behind anti-disc rimination law 
and policy on the other. On the one hand, increased longevity of the population 
6. Thus, e.g., Riach and Rich conclude their paper “An experimental investigation of age 
discrimination in the English labor market”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3029, Sept. 2007, with 
the statement “Another signiﬁcant distinction in respect of age-based afﬁrmative action is that, 
whereas whites never become black, and only rarely do males become female, the young do 
become old. In other words we should expect lesser hostility from the ‘majority’ group, as in this 
case they stand to beneﬁt in their turn” (p. 23).
7. See for the situation in the US in the 1990’s Rutherglenn, “From race to age: The expand-
ing scope of employment discrimination law”, 24 Journal of Legal Studies (1995), 491–532, 
with a table at 512 showing that age discrimination cases are lodged with courts mainly by white 
men (74% of all cases), while less than 5% of all other discrimination cases are brought by white 
men.
8. For further references see Sergeant, Age Discrimination in Employment (Gower Publish-
ing, 2006), pp. 4–6.
9. Plans to expand the scope of the prohibition to access to and supply with goods and ser-
vices, education, social security and social advantages have not been successful to date. The 
proposed Council Directive on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons 
Irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation (COM(2008)426 ﬁnal) 
has not been received favourably in the Council, and is still pending in the EU legislative pro-
cess. The last debate in the Council in Dec. 2010 was minuted as ﬁnding that “there is no current 
prospect of achieving unanimity” (PRES/10/331).
10. See e.g. Fredman, “The age of equality”, in Fredman and Spencer (Eds.) Age as an 
Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives (Hart, 2003), p. 21, stating that age does neither 
circumscribe a discrete group, and that classifying people in age groups is “not always invidi-
ous”; and Gerards, “Discrimination grounds”, in Schiek et al. (Eds.) Cases. Materials and Text 
on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Hart Publishing, 2007), 
p. 149, who does not perceive a “degree of social prejudice comparable to that visible with 
respect to race, ethnic origin, sexual orientation or gender”. 
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and declining fertility rates are quoted as necessitating a more positive approach 
to older employees from an economic point of view.11 On the other hand, if 
based on the general rationale of anti-discrimination policy, age discrimination 
should be prohibited in order to protect the dignity of older people against 
stereotyping12 and to combat “ageism” against “older people” in general, which 
by some accounts affects anyone over forty.13 These original non-discrimina-
tion rationales are, however, in danger of playing second fiddle to the more 
economically motivated ones referred to above. As will be shown in more 
detail below, economic rationales also threaten to promote a more lenient 
approach towards age discrimination than to other grounds of discrimination. 
This raises the interesting question which standards should apply in cases 
where discrimination on grounds of age intersects with discrimination on 
another ground, such as sex, race or disability. 14  
While it would be possible to expand on each of these theoretical points 
in monograph-type dimensions,15 this article endeavours to expound them 
through the lens of recent case law. Interestingly, recent case law of the Court 
of Justice from 2010,16 mainly by its Grand Chamber,17 has touched upon each 
of them: the Court has been asked to consider employment-related justifica-
tions of age-related different treatment in a number of cases, many of which 
could have been discussed under the notion of multiple and intersectional 
discrimination as well, and it has used different levels of scrutiny. This begs 
the question whether it has treated age discrimination with more leniency than 
it would have treated other forms of discrimination, and if so, whether this 
endangers adequate levels of protection, in particular when age discrimination 
and other forms of discrimination intersect. 
The argument pursued is based on three interrelated hypotheses. First, it is 
submitted that age is seen as an important factor for Member States to rely on 
in their employment and social policy, which again is the base for specific 
justifications of distinctions based on age (Art. 6 Directive 2000/78/EC). An 
11. This aspect is emphasized e.g. by Shaw and Shaw, “Recent advancements in European 
employment law: Towards a transformative legal formula for preventing workplace ageism”, 26 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2010), 273–294.
12. Fredman, op. cit. supra note 6. 
13. See e.g. Shaw and Shaw, op. cit. supra note 11.
14. On the speciﬁc relevance of these three grounds see the contributions to Schiek and Law-
son (Eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality (Ashgate, 2011).
15. See e.g. Calasanti and Slevin, Age Matters: Realigning Feminist Thinking (Routledge, 
2006); and Davies (Ed.), Age Discrimination (Kluwer, 2007), in addition to Sergeant, op. cit. 
supra note 8 and Fredman and Spencer, op. cit. supra note 10.
16. Petersen, Kücükdeveci, Bulicke, Hütter, Andersen, Rosenbladt, Georgiev and Wolf, cited 
supra note 1.
17. Petersen, Kücükdeveci, Andersen, Rosenbladt and Wolf, cited supra note 1. 
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analysis of recent case law relating to age-related employment policy will show 
that the European judiciary has reconciled these policy demands and the ban 
on age discrimination by relinquishing a strict standard of scrutiny in favour 
of a looser one at times. Second, it is suggested that the underlying rationales 
of age-related social policy decisions are the reason why differentiations on 
grounds of age will often also lead to disadvantage related to other discrimina-
tion grounds. Again, recent case law will be used to demonstrate the point. The 
third hypothesis is that if the ground “age” is used with preference over other 
underlying grounds, this may lead to scrutiny levels that are not appropriate 
to the non-age grounds typically intersecting with age discrimination in 
employment. 
The article will proceed as follows. It will first briefly introduce a discrim-
ination-based rationale for banning age-related differentiation, and contrast 
this with the reasons for the continued use of age as a parameter for employ-
ment and social policy. It will then show how the outdated reasons for age 
differentiation in employment command greater leniency on the part of the 
European judiciary towards age discrimination than, for example, towards sex 
and race discrimination, considering the different doctrinal structures of a 
general principle of equal treatment on the one hand, and a non-discrimination 
principle on the other hand. It will next consider which cases would have war-
ranted specific attention because age discrimination was inextricably linked 
with another ground. It will conclude that age discrimination cases must be 
approached with special caution so as not to extend the generous justification 
regime found there to discrimination on other grounds, in particular sex and 
race. 
2. Age – between non-discrimination and employment flexibility 
2.1. Why ban age discrimination in employment? 
All the difficulties in applying the EU law ban on age discrimination adequately 
may make it seem questionable why such a ban should exist at all. To answer 
this question, it is useful to consider rationales behind bans of discrimination 
more generally. As expanded elsewhere in more detail,18 bans on discrimina-
tion are based on two different rationales, which usually reinforce each other. 
18. Schiek, “Broadening the scope and the norms of EU gender equality law: Towards a 
 multidimensional conception of equality law”, 12 MJ (2005), 427–466, at 443–448; Schiek, 
“ Organizing EU equality law around the nodes of ‘race’, gender and disability”, in Schiek and 
Lawson (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 14, pp. 20–22. 
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First, discrimination can undermine the human desire to develop an individual 
identity by subjecting individuals to stereotyped judgment. Thus, the first ratio-
nale for banning discrimination is the rationale of individuation as enabling 
persons to choose beyond stereotypes imposed on them. The individuation 
rationale suggests that human beings have more in common than any traditional 
stratifier such as sex, race or disability would suggest. Accordingly, even if 
people are different in relation to sex, race or abilities, this does not suffice to 
treat them differently. The fact that people deserve equal treatment irrespective 
of sex, race and disability should not distract one from the fact that there are 
some differences between persons related to sex, race, disability and other 
“discrimination grounds”. For example, only women can bear children, and 
some people are unable to see or to jump stairs. If discrimination law were to 
ignore these differences, social disadvantage based on stereotypes would per-
sist. Acknowledging the dignity of each person despite differences is thus 
another rationale underlying non-discrimination law. This rationale demands 
one to avoid assimilationist pressure and may require the accommodation of 
differences relating to single grounds. 
 Under these rationales, a ban on age discrimination can be justified if age 
leads to false stereotyping based on social constructs. Such stereotypes can 
include the assumption that people above a certain age are inflexible, inherently 
conservative and less productive.19 Entrenched stereotypes can prevent people 
above a certain age from choosing challenging occupations. At the same time, 
a dominant culture of youthfulness can pressurize older people into appearing 
younger than they are, and wasting time and other resources on maintaining 
such an appearance to avoid stereotyping. As the high unemployment rates of 
people under 25 indicate, there are also stereotypes connected with young ages. 
Banning age discrimination under the non-discrimination rationale would 
require allowing only very limited exceptions from this ban, however, and 
would also outlaw the widely accepted use of age as a differentiating factor in 
employment and social policy. 
2.2. Age as a factor in employment and social policy
The wide-spread generosity towards age-related differentiations is based on 
the traditional use of age as a stratifier in employment and social policy, which 
again is related to traditional functions of European welfare regimes. 
19. See on these Evans, “Age discrimination: Implications of the ageing process”, in 
 Fredman and Spencer, op. cit. supra note 10, 16–19, Sargeant, “Disability and age – Multiple 
potential for discrimination”, 33 International Journal of the Sociology of Law (2005), 19.
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Since the beginning of industrialization, European welfare regimes have 
served to synchronize life-courses of the working population into a three phase 
model, commencing with childhood and education, continuing with adulthood 
and employed work or unpaid work while mothering, and ending with old age 
dedicated to leisure and recovering from a lifetime’s work.20 Entitlements to 
old age pensions in particular have contributed to the general expectation that 
people of pensionable age will no longer seek employment, and no longer 
compete with the young. The more recent entitlements to free education and 
even support for students were traditionally based on the assumption that 
younger ages are dedicated to education, and may well have generated expec-
tations for young people not to work. 
In synchronizing life-courses, welfare States also entrenched the life cycle 
rhythms seen as characteristic for the typical worker, the male bread winner. 
In particular in the so-called conservative models of welfare States,21 entitle-
ments were threatened by interruptions of employment as a consequence of 
motherhood and related phases of housewifery. Beyond this, the life cycle 
rhythms instituted by welfare regimes and employment also entrenched dom-
inant life models, resulting in potentially negative effects on parts of the pop-
ulace not coming within the fold of dominant patterns of employment.
Such traditional welfare regimes have long come to be seen as inadequate, 
as socio-economic circumstances have changed immensely since their incep-
tion in the late 19th century.22 Among the four conditions quoted as favourable 
for the emanation of European welfare States,23 the Fordist organization of the 
20. See e.g. Guillemard, “The advent of a ﬂexible life-course and the reconﬁguration of 
 welfare”, in Andersen et al. (Eds.), The new face of welfare (Policy Press, 2005), pp. 132–133 
with numerous references to sociological literature on welfare.
21. This refers to the categorizations offered by Esping-Andersen, who distinguished three 
core social models within Europe: the liberal model (represented by the UK and Ireland in the 
EU), the social-democratic model (represented by the Scandinavian countries) and the conserva-
tive model (represented by continental States such as Germany, France, and Italy). See Esping-
Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Polity Press & Princeton, 1990), reﬁned and 
defended in Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (OUP, 1999), 
ch.5 (Comparative welfare regimes re-examined), pp. 72–94.
22. On the history of European welfare States see Kuhnle and Sander, “The emergence of the 
western welfare State”, in Castles, Leibfried, Lewis, Obinger and Pierson (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of the European Welfare State (OUP 2010), pp. 61–79.
23. These are commonly listed as: (1) stable growth of an economy dominated by a manu-
facturing sector governed by principles associated with “Fordism”, (2) dominance of a family 
structure which provides unpaid (female) labour for caring for children, frail persons and other 
excluded groups while supporting a (male) wage earner, (3) governments dedicated and able to 
manage their national economies relying on post-Keynesian principles, and (4) coordinated 
interaction between the middle and working classes within national societies supporting a social 
compromise (see e.g. Taylor-Gooby, New Risks, New Welfare – The Transformation of the Euro-
pean Welfare State (OUP, 2004), p. 1, with references to Scharpf, Pierson, Ferrera and Rhodes).
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economy constitutes a decisive element. Its tendency towards standardization 
of production and consumption also supported a standardization of life courses, 
in particular for male breadwinners, which was in turn underpinned by the 
synchronization function of traditional welfare States.
The progressive development of the European economies has resulted in 
re-deployment of manufacturing to other parts of the world and an increased 
focus on service-related industries in Europe. While a service-based economy 
can easily result in low-quality and low-education employment,24 the European 
Union has endeavoured to establish itself as the world’s most competitive 
knowledge-based economy while maintaining a European Social Model,25 an 
aim which is now to be pursued through “smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth”.26 The knowledge-based economies constitute the more profitable 
sectors of the service industry, and are characterized by fast-moving develop-
ment and demand for ever higher and more adaptive qualifications. 
This also requires new and more flexible27 paradigms for life-courses of 
those contributing to the knowledge-based economy. A discrete educational 
phase ending in early adulthood is replaced by the concept of life-long learn-
ing; stable, full-time employment relations during mature adulthood are 
replaced by flexible employment arrangements interspersed by phases of fur-
ther education, non-employed work or unemployment; and a lack of adequate 
social networks to nurture a leisurely “third age” necessitates active ageing, 
including ongoing remunerated work.28 
In short, rigid life-course patterns are no longer adequate, and related pat-
terns of employment and social policy are increasingly dysfunctional.29 Thus, 
age-related social and employment policy may need to be overcome in the 
long term. In the short term, age remains an important instrument to devise 
the policies leading towards this future.30 Accordingly, there is some incentive 
24. See Taylor-Gooby, op. cit. supra note 23, with further references.
25. This was the aim of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy, ofﬁcially inaugurated by an EU summit in 
Lisbon in 2000 (Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, 
“Putting decisions into practice: A more coherent and systematic approach”). 
26. This slogan characterizes the new EU 2020 strategy, spelled out in the Commission 
Communication, “European Commission, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth”, COM(2010)2020 ﬁnal, and adopted by the European Council of June 2010 
(EUCO 7/10), both available from <ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm>.
27. See for the model of the “Transitional Labour Markets” as containing this ﬂexibility the 
contributions in Rogowski (Ed.), The European Social Model and Transitional Labour Markets 
(Ashgate, 2008).
28. See Jessop, “Critical semiotic analysis and cultural political economy”, 1 Critical Dis-
course Studies (2004), 169.
29. See Maydell et al., Enabling Social Europe (Springer, 2006), pp. 86–88.
30. Further on the interrelation on national social policy and age discrimination law see 
 Mabbet, “Age discrimination in law and policy: How the Equal Treatment Directive affects 
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for the courts not to curb the flexibility Member States and social partners may 
need in order to overcome the life-cycle orientation of European welfare States 
in socially acceptable ways. 
2.3. Legislative and judicial approaches to age-speciﬁc differentiation
The contrast between the ban on age discrimination and the widespread use of 
age to justify different treatment in employment and social policy leads to a 
certain ambiguity of EU age discrimination law. 
EU non-discrimination law is generally based on a “closed list approach”,31 
specifying explicitly the grounds on which basis discrimination is not tolerated. 
In accordance with this, direct discrimination on any of these grounds cannot 
be generally justified. 32 Direct discrimination can only be based on specific 
exemptions provided for by the legislature.
By contrast, a general principle of equal treatment grants a much lower level 
of protection. It only “requires that similar situations shall not be treated dif-
ferently unless different treatment is objectively justified”.33 This means that 
policy-makers and also economic actors can justify any different treatment on 
any ground, as long as they find a good reason, and the differentiation is pro-
portionate to this reason. 
In relation to age discrimination, EU law seems to take a position in between 
those two poles. As indicated by recital 25 of Directive 2000/78/EC, the EU 
legislature recognizes the legitimate role of age in a number of different social 
policy contexts. Accordingly, the Directive allows for Member States to clas-
sify different treatment on grounds of age as non-discriminatory if this is 
“objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate 
employment policy (and) labour market … objectives” (Art. 6(1)), specifying 
a number of typical justifications in a non-exhaustive list (Art. 6(2)). Thus, 
discrimination on grounds of age can be justified under a looser standard, in 
addition to those cases where a strict objective justification of different 
national welfare States”, in Ross and Borgmann-Prebil (Eds.), Promoting Solidarity in the Euro-
pean Union (OUP, 2010).
31. By contrast, under the ECHR as under many national constitutions, an “open list 
approach” is pursued, listing some characteristics which must not form the starting point of dif-
ferent treatment, and leaving the development of further grounds to the judiciary. In practice, 
open lists are operated by subjecting different treatment on different grounds to different degrees 
of scrutiny (see Gerards, op. cit. supra note 10, 33–35). Accordingly, an open list system always 
allows for justiﬁcations of direct discrimination, and does not require the legislature to provide 
for speciﬁc exemptions. 
32. For a defence of this principle, with reference to some aberrations in ECJ case law, see 
Ellis, Eu Anti-Discrimination Law (OUP, 2005), p. 111.
33. E.g. C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique, [2008] ECR I-9895, paras. 23–57.
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 treatment based on a limited number of motives is possible (Arts. 2(5) and 4(1) 
Directive 2000/78/EC). 
The difference between these two standards of justification has been 
acknowledged by the Court in Age Concern England.34 However, refraining 
from viewing the ban as a specific case of the general principle of equal 
treatment,35 the Court classified Article 6(1) as another exception to the ban 
of discrimination, which must be read narrowly.36 Thus, Article 6(1) does not 
necessarily move age discrimination outside the scope of non-discrimination. 
However, it pays tribute to the widespread use of age bands in social and 
employment policy, and gives Member States an additional justification for 
maintaining relevant social policies. 
The Court’s standards in applying this specific justification have varied so 
far. In Mangold, the Court had applied a strict standard of judicial review, 
stressing explicitly that Article 6(1) Directive 2000/78/EC provides for an 
exception from an individual right.37 Accordingly, the Court considered spe-
cifically whether different treatment on grounds of age was sufficiently targeted 
so as to meet the alleged aim of the legislation (enhancing the labour market 
prospects of those unemployed and older than 52), and held that the contested 
national rule was not justified.38 In Palacios de la Villa, the Court applied a 
much looser standard of scrutiny, stressing that the Member States and, where 
appropriate, the social partners, “enjoy a broad discretion … in their definition 
of measures capable of achieving” the regulatory goal.39 The Court also allowed 
the regulators to change their assessment40 and stressed the added value of 
flexibility gained by allowing the social partners to opt for compulsory retire-
ment, considering their capacity to guard the weighing  of interests adequately. 41 
Accordingly, the Court considered the national rule justified. While the Court 
decided on the question whether the national legislation was justified in these 
34. Age Concern England, cited supra note 1, paras. 59–67.
35. For a defence of such a view, in reliance on the Mangold decision, see Thüsing and 
 Horler, case note on Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdedveci v. Swedex, judgment of 19 Jan. 2010, 
nyr, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 1167. This article does not discuss the effect of a general principle of 
non-discrimination of age in EU law, which has recently been used by the Court to enhance 
effects of directives based on such general principles (on this aspect see Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-
Fons, “The constitutional allocation of powers and general principles of EU law”, 47 CML Rev. 
(2010), 1629–1649, Editorial Comments, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 1589–1596 and Muir, “Of ages 
in – and edges of – EU law”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 39–62).
36. Age Concern England, cited supra note 1, para 62.
37. Mangold, cited supra note 1, para 65.
38. Ibid. 
39. Palacios de la Villa, cited supra note 1, para 68, (case note by Waddington, 45 CML Rev. 
(2008), 895–905).
40. Ibid., para 70.
41. Ibid., para 74.
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two cases, it left that decision to the national court in the Age Concern case. 
However, in Age Concern the Court also stressed that the level of discretion 
left to the Member States must not “have the effect of frustrating the imple-
mentation of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age”.42 
3. Justifying employment policy demands for age-related distinctions – 
recent case law 
Clearly, these were contradictory judgments, which raised more questions than 
gave answers on how to balance the tension between banning age discrimina-
tion and respecting the conventional use of age differentiation in employment 
and social policy. Thus, it is not surprising that these tensions have been further 
explored in recent references. Four cases concerned compulsory retirement or 
other restrictions on grounds of reaching a certain age,43 another one a maxi-
mum age limit for commencing a certain career,44 and two related to legislation 
according to which seniority accrued before a certain minimum age fails to 
convey specific employment rights.45 
3.1. Retirement policies
In line with the assumption that employees can be expected to cease working 
upon reaching the “third age”, national legislation and collective agreements 
frequently contain rules encouraging or even requiring employees to drop out 
at a certain age. In the four cases recently decided in this field, the Court has 
mainly accepted the justifications brought forward by Member States, thus 
respecting the long tradition on which these differentiations were based. 
Often, rules encouraging retirement are based on general assumptions 
regarding the human ageing process and the related stereotype that people over 
the pensionable age will usually not be sufficiently fit to deliver employment-
related tasks. 
In the Rosenbladt case,46 referred by a German labour tribunal, the Court 
made this assumption explicit. Mrs Rosenbladt’s part-time contract of 
42. Age Concern England, cited supra note 1, para 51.
43. Petersen, Andersen, Rosenbladt and Georgiev, cited supra note 1. The references in 
Fuchs and Köhler, op. cit. supra note 3, likewise relate to compulsory retirement of public ser-
vants. 
44. Wolf, cited supra note 1.
45. Hütter and Kücükdeveci, cited supra note 1. Bulicke, cited supra note 1, is not discussed 
in detail, because the reference question only referred to the time limit for bringing discrimina-
tion claims. 
46. Rosenbladt, cited supra note 1.
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 employment as an untrained cleaner stipulated that the employment relation-
ship would end with the month when the employee could first claim a pension. 
This clause relied on the relevant sectoral collective agreement, according to 
which the employment relationship ended either with the month when the 
employee turned 65 or with the month when the employee could first claim 
an old-age pension if the contract of employment did not explicitly state oth-
erwise. The German Equal Treatment Act deemed such clauses in collective 
agreements and individual employment contracts to constitute objectively and 
reasonably justified age-related distinctions. At the same time, the Social Secu-
rity Code stipulated that unilateral dismissal upon reaching the pensionable 
age was not justified. The question referred to the Court was whether this 
proviso for contractual termination of the employment relationship violated 
the ban on age discrimination. The Court accepted the German legislation as 
justified under Article 6 Directive 2000/78/EC, stressing the difference between 
unilateral dismissal and a rule requiring the employee’s or her trade union’s 
consent to a contractual retirement clause,47 and demanding that each indi-
vidual and collective agreement must be subjected to judicial scrutiny as well. 
The German court had identified the need to plan personnel development and 
to allow access to the employment market by young people as regulatory aims. 
The Court accepted this justification, relying on Mrs Rosenbladt’s ability to 
find other employment after her 65th birthday, and also endorsing the German 
Government’s position that “automatic termination of employment contracts 
also has the advantage of not requiring employers to dismiss employees on the 
ground that they are no longer capable of working, which may be humiliating 
for those who have reached an advanced age”. 48
Also, retirement at pensionable age has traditionally been used to manage 
the employment market. The encouraged or compulsory retirement at age 65 
or similar is thus based on the idea of revolving doors towards employment, 
which by steering older people out of employment, can allow access for 
younger ones. The Court has accepted such justifications in two cases, the 
Petersen case and the Georgiev case, but rejected them in the Andersen case. 
In the Petersen case, the Grand Chamber considered German legislation 
establishing the age of 68 as upper limit for dentists accredited to treat patients 
covered by public health insurance (panel dentists). The justification of that 
rule was twofold. On the one hand, it was meant to secure high quality treat-
ment of patients and thus to avoid health risks. An additional justification was 
seen in the aim to “ensure a balanced sharing of burdens between the 
generations”49 of panel dentists, securing employment opportunities for the 
47. Rosenbladt, cited supra note 1, paras. 49–50.
48. Ibid., paras. 43, 45.
49. Petersen, cited supra note 1, para 22, referring to the position of the Federal Social Court. 
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young upon retirement of the old. This justification was particularly pertinent 
while a quota system restricting the number of panel dentists per district was 
operated until December 2006. The Court of Justice left it to the national courts 
to decide which justifications were relevant. The justification relating to pro-
tection of patients’ health (see Art. 2(5) Directive 2000/78/EC50) was dismissed 
on grounds of inconsistency: after all, dentists were under no age-related 
restriction to practise on patients seeking privately funded dentistry. Accord-
ingly, the case would turn on the question whether the sharing of burdens 
between generations could justify age-restriction on publicly funded dentistry 
under Article 6(1) Directive 2000/78/EC. The Court did not bother much with 
the principle of proportionality, and also did not refer to the second chamber 
decision in Age Concern. Within two meagre paragraphs, it considered the 
measure justified, should a shortage of positions for panel dentists still exist 
or threaten to re-occur.51 The Petersen ruling thus seemed to establish a rather 
loose standard of scrutiny for judging age-related retirement policies motivated 
by employment market pressures, reminiscent of the Palacios case. 
The recent ruling in Georgiev,52 also on compulsory retirement at the age 
of 68, seems to confirm this tendency. It related to retirement policies in the 
Bulgarian university sector, where legislation required university professors 
to retire from their public servant position at the age of 65, allowing for reap-
pointment under a succession of fixed term contracts until the age of 68. Chal-
lenging these rules, referring to the ban of age discrimination, the claimant 
alleged that they do not pursue any specified objective. If they would aim – as 
assumed by the Commission and some governments – at securing employment 
opportunities for younger university staff by retiring the old, they were dis-
proportionate because young people were not interested in the relevant careers. 
Moreover, he submitted that the retirement policy was inconsistent in only 
applying to professorial positions, but not to lecturers and non-permanent 
teaching staff. Again, the Court used a loose standard of scrutiny, stressing that 
encouraging recruitment of younger people by dismissing older ones was a 
legitimate aim for a policy relying on differentiation by age. The Court had to 
distinguish this case from Mangold, as Bulgarian law, too, allowed fixed-term 
contracts with employees beyond a certain age. It relied inter alia on the fact 
50. This provision is speciﬁc for Directive 2000/78/EC, but not for age discrimination. It 
allows differentiation to be upheld generally if necessary (inter alia) for the protection of health. 
See for a critical assessment Bell, “Direct discrimination”, in Schiek et al. (Eds.), Cases, 
 Materials and Text on International, Supranational and National Non-Discrimination Law 
(Oregon, 2007), 289–384.
51. Petersen, cited supra note 1, paras. 73 and 76, with the result stated in para 77.
52. Georgiev, cited supra note 1. 
Age discrimination 789
that the age threshold of 68 was much higher,53 and that t he employees affected 
were eligible for a pension.
In Andersen,54 the Court was less accepting. The case related to severance 
payments, which under Danish law were owed to any employee dismissed 
after having accrued eight years seniority. However, employees eligible to 
claim a pension from an employer-funded “second pillar pension scheme” 
which they had joined before their 50th birthday were excluded from the statu-
tory severance payment. Statute subjected eligibility to claim a 2nd pillar pen-
sion to a minimum age, which could vary according to the relevant collective 
agreement, and fixed at 60 in Mr Anderson’s case. The justification brought 
forward by the Danish Government relied on employment policy: while the 
severance payment is usually meant to cover expenses of workers while search-
ing for new employment, the legislature assumed that employees eligible for 
an occupational pension would leave the employment market and not need this 
support. In considering whether this rule can be justified, the Court first stressed 
the Member States’ broad discretion with reference to Palacio, but emphasized 
in the same paragraph that this discretion “must not have the effect of frustrat-
ing the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age”.55 The Grand Cham-
ber thus endorsed a principle first developed in the ruling on Age Concern 
England.56 In contrast with the other cases discussed above, the Grand Cham-
ber used a strict standard of scrutiny in judging Mr Andersen’s case. It subse-
quently discussed whether the measure was disproportionate because it affected 
employees actually drawing occupational pension as well as those who wished 
to continue working. In what seemed a complete turnaround from Palacios, 
the legislative rule was held to be disproportionate because it went over and 
above what was necessary to achieve its aim in withholding the severance 
payment also from those employees who did not wish to retire on being eli-
gible. Accordingly, the Danish legislation was held to contravene the prohibi-
tion of age discrimination. 
With Andersen being the exception to the rule, the Court applied a looser 
standard of scrutiny on national legislation encouraging retirement at 65 or 68, 
relying mainly on the Palacios de la Villa ruling.57 As a result, Member States 
could successfully rely on the viability of age-determined life cycles, although 
53. Ibid., para 63 (the age after which ﬁxed term employment contracts were always deemed 
to be justiﬁed was 52).
54. Andersen, cited supra note 1.
55. Ibid., para 32.
56. Age Concern England, cited supra note 1, paras. 59–67.
57. Rosenbladt, cited supra note 1, paras. 41, 48–49, 51, 62, 67. The decision in Age Concern 
is referred to in paras. 44 and 58, but the formula that the wide discretion for national policy-
makers must not frustrate the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is not reiterated.
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these are less and less viable under increasing demands of individual flexibil-
ity and the knowledge-based economy. While flexibility was duly stressed, the 
Court did not require employers to be flexible regarding the wishes of employ-
ees to work past the pensionable age. Rather, the Court granted Member States 
and social partners a wide discretion in phasing men and women in the “third 
age” out of gainful employment. 
Overall, it seems that the ban of age discrimination offers little protection 
against being pressurized into retiring once able to claim an old age pen-
sion – even if that pension is far from sufficient to cover living expenses, as 
in the Rosenbladt case. 
3.2. Protecting educational commitments in the ﬁrst phase of the life-cycle 
Regarding the first phase of the life-cycle, at stake in the cases Kücükdeveci 
and Hütter, the Court appears to show more determination to effectively ban 
age discrimination. 
The German rule under scrutiny in the Kücükdeveci case58 referred to statu-
tory notice periods. Paragraph 622 section 2 of the German civil code provided 
for the basic statutory notice period of four weeks to increase with seniority 
to up to seven months. However, as an exception, the second sentence of the 
same provision proclaimed that seniority accrued before an employee’s 25th 
birthday was to be disregarded. As this obviously constitutes a direct dis-
crimination on grounds of age, the Court was again challenged to assess jus-
tifications under Article 6(1) Directive 2000/78/EC. The rule (originating from 
1929) endorsed the demand for younger workers to change employers fre-
quently in order to gain experience, and encouraged this by avoiding any 
incentive to accrue seniority before the age of 25. The German Government, 
however, identified the aims of the rule as demanding greater flexibility from 
younger workers.59 After duly stressing the broad discretion awarded to Mem-
ber States in choosing aims of employment legislation,60 the Court determined 
that the consequences of the rule at stake are not only felt by younger workers, 
but also by workers long past the age of 25. Thus the rule failed the test for its 
inconsistency. 
The Grand Chamber, deciding in Kücükdeveci, confirmed the approach 
taken by the Third Chamber in the Hütter case.61 This case concerned an 
58. Kücükdeveci, cited supra note 1. The case has become famous as a follow-up to Mangold 
for its new doctrine on horizontal effects of general principles of EU law. This aspect is not 
 covered here, as it has been discussed widely, e.g. Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons, op. cit. supra 
note 35, Muir op. cit. supra note 35.
59. Related in Kücükdeveci, cited supra note 1, para 35.
60. Kücükdeveci, cited supra note 1, para 38.
61. Hütter, cited supra note 1.
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 Austrian act on grading of public servants, according to which any seniority 
accrued before the age of 18 would be disregarded in determining salary incre-
ments. Again, this rule differentiated on grounds of age, and it affected worker 
throughout their career. For example, Mr Hütter found that he earned less than 
a colleague commencing employment on the same day, and having completed 
an identical apprenticeship. The justification ultimately related to the role of 
education: the rule encouraged commencing employment after the 18th birth-
day, deeming it more important to engage in full-time education to a level 
allowing access to higher education in principle. Based on a detailed engage-
ment with the aims brought forward, the Court found that the preconditions 
for higher education could be acquired at any age, which again rendered the 
rule inappropriate to achieve the alleged aims. 
3.3. Maximum recruitment age
Finally, in the Wolf case, the Court’s Grand Chamber had to deal with a statu-
tory maximum recruitment age of 30 for fire-fighters established in a German 
Land. 
Three justifications were submitted: first, the legislation sought to ensure 
that the public employer could profit from the relative expensive training 
for a long time; second, a balanced age structure was aimed at; third, in order 
to ensure sufficient time to accrue a State pension, a minimum duration of 
employment before retirement. These motives seem to describe a typical 
human resources approach to hiring younger people, in order to save additional 
costs. In this respect, the referring court clearly aimed to receive some clari-
fication on Article 6(1)(c) Directive 2000/78/EC, which provides that maxi-
mum ages can be justified by reference to amortization of training costs through 
allowing for a reasonable period of employment before retirement. However, 
the Court chose to steer the case towards the “genuine occupational require-
ment” justification under Article 4, which is not specific to age discrimination. 
However, the arguments submitted by the German Government concerning 
the physical demands of the fire-fighting profession were not free from age-
related stereotype. It was suggested that anyone past the age of 45 or 50 was 
no longer able to engage in active fire-fighting due to the “medically proven 
ageing process”.62 Accordingly the Court concluded in 8 paragraphs that “very 
few officers over 45 years have sufficient physical capacity to perform the 
fire-fighting part of their activities”.63 This sufficed as justification. 
62. Wolf, cited supra note 1, para 34.
63. Ibid., para 41.
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3.4. Achieving ﬂexibility through collective agreements
In line with the enhanced flexibility required by the Lisbon strategy and its 
successors, the Court also found additional arguments in favour of flexibility 
in the collective bargaining process. As already in Palacios,64 the Court stressed 
the role of social partners in providing flexibility by relaxing employees’ pro-
tection in the Rosenbladt case.65 Interestingly, the Court refers to a decision 
where it had likewise acknowledged the fundamental rights quality of collec-
tive bargaining rights, but established that the choices made by the social 
partners could not override EU legislation aiming to liberalize the market in 
public contracts.66 In relation to age discrimination cases, by contrast, the ref-
erence to a fundamental right to collective agreements is utilized to justify 
restrictions of workers’ rights.67 This line of argument also establishes a dif-
ference from earlier case law on sex equality.68 While the Court was adamant 
that rules in collective agreements needed to comply fully with the prohibition 
of sex discrimination,69 it now seems to view the fact that retirement policies 
have been introduced by collective agreement as a legitimating factor. The role 
of collective agreements in relation to age discrimination will be further 
explored by the Court in the pending cases Mai and Hennings, which refer to 
age-related salary increments and a severance plan for collective redundancy 
respectively, established by collective agreements.70 
3.5. Balancing age-related stereotype and legitimate employment policy
As has been shown, the case law on age discrimination is still in development. 
Accordingly, the Court is still finding its way to a consistent approach to apply-
ing Article 6(1) Directive 2000/78/EC. However, it is possible to make an 
interim assessment at this point. 
First of all, it should be acknowledged that the Court has applied a strict 
standard of scrutiny in three out of eight cases analysed in more detail here. 
64. Palacios de la Villa, cited supra note 1, on this aspect see text accompanying supra notes 
37 and 39.
65. This was stressed in Rosenbladt, cited supra note 1, para 69.
66. Case C-271/08, Commission v. Germany, judgment of 15 July 2010, nyr, para 37
67. Rosenbladt, cited supra note 1, paras. 68–69.
68. On the Court’s case law on sex equality from 2000 to 2006 see Castello and Davies, “The 
case law of the Court of Justice in the ﬁeld of sex equality since 2000”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 
1567–1612.
69. First established in Case C-33/89, Nimz, [1990] ECRI-2591, paras. 12–13 and C-184/90, 
Kowalska, [1991] ECR I-297, paras. 20–21, this has more recently been reafﬁrmed, e.g., in 
C-284/02, Sass, [2004] ECR I-11143, para 59. 
70. Mai and Hennings, cited supra note 3.
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Such a strict standard seems appropriate when adjudicating on a directive 
which, after all, expresses fundamental rights. 
However, in the majority of cases, the Court has taken a more generous 
approach, at times displaying a limited degree of sensitivity to the realities of 
age discrimination. Both in the cases of Rosenbladt and Wolf, the Court 
accepted reference to stereotyping, to the effect that older people will always 
become incapable of performing physically demanding tasks71 or any tasks in 
a sensible way it all, necessitating a paternalistic approach to older employees 
who should not be subjected to the humiliation of being declared unfit to work.72 
Such stereotyping i s at the heart of any form of discrimination in social prac-
tice. An approach based on principles of non-discrimination would suggest 
that employers must make individual assessments rather than using age-related 
stereotypes. As it is, the Court seems prepared to allow flexibility in favour of 
life-cycle policies without considering how a reinforcement of stereotypes 
undermining the dignity of older workers can be avoided. 
4. Intersections between age and other grounds 
Having considered the way in which the Court balances the necessity to pro-
vide flexibility for social and employment policies and the demands of safe-
guarding the non-discrimination principle in relation to age, we shall now 
approach our second hypothesis: is the ground “age”, because agreeable to all 
parts of the population, now used more frequently in litigation even if on the 
facts different discrimination grounds would apply in addition to age? And if 
that is the case, would defendants profit from relaxed standards of justification 
applicable to age, although they would have to defend their decisions very 
seriously, under stricter standards of scrutiny applied, for example, race and 
ethnicity. The case of the combination of age discrimination with other grounds 
is thus not only an interesting aspect of the theoretical discussion of 
intersectionality:73 the choice of the “wrong” discrimination ground can have 
huge practical consequences. 
71. Wolf, cited supra note 1, paras. 39–41. This issue, along with a justiﬁcation for different 
treatment in order to maintain a “balanced age structure” in the work force will be revisited in 
the Balaban reference, Case C-86/10.
72. Rosenbladt, cited supra note 1, para 43, reporting the position of the German Govern-
ment that “automatic termination of employment contracts also has the advantage of not requir-
ing employers to dismiss employees on the ground that they are no longer capable of working, 
which may be humiliating for those who have reached an advanced age”. The Court then 
endorses this as in principle objectively and reasonable justifying different treatment (para 45).
73. See on this the contributions in Schiek and Lawson, op. cit supra note 14; Schiek and 
Chege (Eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidi-
mensional Equality Law, (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009); and Grabham, Cooper, Krishnadas and 
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4.1. Is age really the white men’s privilege? 
Of those cases discussed above, the cases Kücükdeveci, Rosenbladt and 
Petersen are based on facts indicative of multiple discrimination. Accordingly, 
they could also have been approached under a different ground in addition to 
age.
The Kücükdeveci case offers an interesting example. The full case was cer-
tainly less “dull” 74 than the part at stake before the Court of Justice. When 
Seda Kücükdeveci was dismissed after 10 years continuous employment with 
Swedex GmbH & Co KG aged 28, she had had a part-time position as a 
manual worker in the company’s shipping department in O. for a gross monthly 
wage of just above € 700. When her employer closed down the shipping depart-
ment in O., having stopped the production in the same location earlier that 
year, she hoped for a transfer to sales another of Swedex’s branches, in F. Upon 
her return from parental leave in mid-2005, she had already negotiated such a 
possibility, and she knew that this particular department was again inviting 
applications. In spite of this, she was dismissed with effect from 31 January 
2007. With her claim to Mönchengladbach Labour Court, she challenged this 
dismissal also for discrimination on grounds of ethnic and racial origin. In 
doing so, she relied on paragraph 2(2) KSchG (German Employment Protec-
tion Act), according to which a dismissal is – among others – not justified if 
the employer is able to offer alternative employment. She alleged that such 
alternative employment existed, but was denied to her for reasons based on 
discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin. In relation to the post in 
sales, her employer had been adamant that she was not suitable for the post, 
among others because her German was slightly accented and she would have 
to be trained in typing and data processing. The first instance court, in its judg-
ment on 15 June 2007,75 held in favour of the claimant and declared the dis-
missal ineffective relying on paragraph 2 KSchG and the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin. The Labour Court found 
that in denying the claimant’s suitability for the position in sales because of 
her accented German, the employer had discriminated against her on grounds 
of race, which violated paragraphs 2 and 7 Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsge-
setz – AGG (German General Equal Treatment Act). 
Seda Kücükdeveci’s lawyer had pleaded both grounds of discrimination, 
but was only partly successful before the Düsseldorf Regional Labour Court. 
However, even if only considering the notice period legislation in paragraph 
Herman (Eds.), Intersectionality and Beyond. Law, power and the politics of location (Rout-
ledge-Cavendish, 2009).
74. See Thüsing and Horler, op. cit. supra note 31.
75. Case no 7 Ca 84/07 (available from Juris and Beck online).
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622 section 2 German Civil Code, the claimant could have alleged not only 
age discrimination, but also indirect ethnic and gender discrimination. As 
explained above, the rule in question contributes to synchronizing life-cycles 
along the lines of dominant patterns. The secret model is the trained male 
manual worker, who starts employment at a young age, but changes employers 
frequently before achieving a more satisfactory, and stable position. This model 
did not apply to Seda Kücükdeveci, who after taking up a semi-trained position 
at age 18 remained with the same employer for 10 years. This situation is rather 
typical for ethnic minority women, as they are often required to contribute to 
the family income before attaining a (lower paid) training position, and find 
it difficult to change employers due to structural discrimination on the labour 
market. Protection against discrimination on grounds of gender and racial or 
ethnic origin is less ambiguous under EU law than protection against age 
discrimination. In particular, there is no specific justification relating to flex-
ible labour markets. Also, basing the claim on all three grounds could have 
afforded the claimant specific damages under the German Equal Treatment 
Act, rather than only gaining a few months additional salary. 
Similarly, compulsory retirement policies such as those at stake in the 
 Peterson and Rosenbladt case could be scrutinized for indirect gender dis-
crimination. As explained above, the underlying rationale presupposes a certain 
model of working life, according to which a worker accumulates sufficient 
pension rights to retire comfortably at the specified age. Those structurally 
excluded from traditional career patterns (e.g. women who take time out to 
care for children or other family members, and others whose entry into or 
progress in working life is delayed due to gender or race discrimination) are 
often unable to accumulate sufficient entitlements and may therefore wish to 
continue working beyond that age. In the Rosenbladt case, the national court 
had highlighted that the claimant’s claim to a pension, based on her part-time 
work as cleaner, would hardly suffice to sustain her. This is a typical situation 
for female manual workers. Accordingly, in addition to the seemingly easy 
claim of direct age discrimination, a parallel claim of indirect sex discrimina-
tion could have been explored. The argument would have been that – due to 
limited pension entitlements – women would be more frequently inclined to 
continue working past 65, and would thus be put at a particular disadvantage 
compared with men. Again, the claimant in the Petersen case only started 
practice as a panel dentist aged 35. While she still had sufficient earnings to 
build up a pension, this pension would have been lower than that of a dentist 
starting at a younger age. Accordingly, the question should have been explored 
whether a shorter period to accumulate pension entitlements was more typical 
for women dentists, and thus a case of indirect discrimination could have been 
established.
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Further, the effects of a maximum recruitment age, relevant in the Wolf case, 
can be seen as more detrimental for women than for men. In particular, it is 
worth noticing that women who had a career break will more often have dif-
ficulties in complying with maximum age limits. However, also the effects of 
a hostile employment market regarding atypical career choices (such as fire-
fighting for women) must be considered in assessing discriminatory effects of 
such age-related barriers. 
4.2. Consequences of preferring “age” over other grounds
As shown in the beginning of this article, the ban on age discrimination in EU 
law is conceptually weaker than other bans on discrimination. This is based 
on the widespread use of age as a stratifier in employment and social policy, 
which seems to require enhanced flexibility in favour of Member States and 
national social partners, even if the underlying paradigms are no longer entirely 
adequate. As a consequence, the EU legislature has provided for specific jus-
tifications in favour of age-related differentiation justified by employment and 
social policies (Art. 6(1) Directive 2000/78/EC). The leniency towards age 
discrimination signalled by this legislative step has been enhanced by the Court 
of Justice, which tends to accept employment-related justifications for age-
related differentiations with surprising ease. While the Court has taken seri-
ously the requirement that the discretion left to the Member States must not 
“have the effect of frustrating the implementation of the principle of non-
discrimination”76 in some cases, they are few and far between. Mainly, the 
formula of Article 6(1) has been used to dilute the difference between a prin-
ciple of non-discrimination and a general principle of equal treatment. The 
doctrinal difference between these two principles lies in the fact that non-
discrimination requires strict obedience. Exceptions can only be accepted 
where these are provided for in legislation. Even if such a legislative justifica-
tion is available, strict scrutiny is required in applying the proportionality test.
Under a general principle of equal treatment, any distinction is capable of 
being justified in principle. This justification is only scrutinized lightly, giving 
the institution establishing different treatment a wide discretion in choosing 
the aims for its distinction, and relieving it from proving that no less intrusive 
alternative for achieving this aim could be found. Arguably, Article 6(1) Direc-
tive 2000/78/EC is positioned somewhere between an exception from a pro-
hibition to discriminate and a mere justification requirement. It thus establishes 
a less stringent test for age-related distinctions, as long as the aims pursued 
with those distinctions are related to employment and social policy. 
76. This formulation from Age Concern, cited supra note 1, para 51 has been endorsed by the 
Grand Chamber in Andersen, cited supra note 1, para 32.
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Considering cases where age and other grounds, such as sex or race, but 
also disability, intersect, the question arises which standard of scrutiny is to 
be applied to each case. There is no explicit rule on this in EU law. However, 
the purpose of EU non-discrimination law to enforce non-discrimination as a 
fundamental right (Art. 21 of the Charter) and as a general principle of EU 
law, would suggest that the multiplication of discrimination grounds must not 
lead to slackening the standards of protection. If anything, a stricter protection 
would seem necessary. While it is inadequate to use national law principles as 
binding on EU judges, national rules can be useful in order to interpret EU law 
in cases of doubt. Against this background, paragraph 4 German Equal Treat-
ment Act is worth mentioning. According to this provision, “discrimination 
based on several grounds … is only capable of being justified ... if the justifi-
cation applies to all the grounds liable for the difference of treatment”.77 
Accordingly, where age intersects with other discrimination grounds, different 
treatment is only justified if the stricter standard of a ground such as sex or 
race is satisfied. 
This approach has been demonstrated (if not explicitly) in the recent Kleist 
judgment,78 which related to compulsory retirement upon reaching pensionable 
age in a jurisdiction where the statutory pensionable age still differed by gen-
der. Rather than relying on a general social policy justification of this age-
related differentiation, the Court stressed that an “exception for the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of sex … must be interpreted strictly”.79 This 
excluded any justification by the objective of “promoting employment of 
younger persons,80 although this justification has been readily accepted for 
different types of age discrimination.81
In cases of intersecting discrimination, such as Kücükdeveci, Petersen and 
Rosenbladt, an additional justification for the underlying gender and ethnic 
discrimination should have been sought. Admittedly, the underlying gender 
discrimination in the latter two cases was only indirect. This renders the estab-
lishment of the gender discrimination case more difficult than that of the direct 
age discrimination case. However, the effort should be made in order not to 
forgo an efficient remedy for violation of a fundamental principle of EU law 
such as the principle of non-discrimination. 
77. English translation from Schiek et al., op. cit. supra note 10, p. 180.
78. Case C-359/09, Kleist, judgment of 18 Nov. 2010, nyr.
79. Ibid., para 39.
80. Ibid., para 45.
81. See text accompanying supra notes 46–51.
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5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Court has attempted to remain within the non-discrimination 
framework in its case law on age discrimination so far. However, at times it 
has used a less strict standard of scrutiny in judging policies related to retire-
ment ages, in particular if supported by collective agreements. This approach 
relied on the specific justification, foreseen in Article 6(1) Directive 2000/78, 
which was introduced into EU legislation in order to allow EU non-discrimi-
nation law to take account of legitimate social policy aims at national level.
However, while age is a widely used stratifier in national social policy, the 
resulting synchronization of life-cycles is no longer adequate to the rising 
demands of individual flexibility in the knowledge-based economy. While 
national social policy slowly develops in other directions, there are still a great 
number of rules that support strict divisions between an education phase in the 
youth, an uninterrupted working life in phase two and a well-earned retirement 
in phase three. As the strict distinction of life cycles was most frequently used 
in countries following the conservative welfare model, it is hardly surprising 
that so many references in this field come from Germany. After all, this coun-
try supports a conservative welfare model. At the same time, it shows some 
reluctance to embrace discrimination grounds such as racial and ethnic origin 
and gender, with the same verve as age. This tends to deflect conflict away 
from these main issues towards the more innocent age ground. 
In addition, differentiation on grounds of age and the resulting synchroniza-
tion of life cycles through social policy also has the effect of excluding non-
dominant ways of life. Thus, rules on compulsory retirement, age limits for 
the access to certain occupations or rules placing seniority accrued at the start 
of a career at a detriment will often affect women or persons of minority eth-
nicity and put them at a particular disadvantage. These cases of multiple dis-
crimination are as yet hardly treated as such. This should be reconsidered. 
Findings of stereotyping against older people and against people in certain age 
bands combined with other characteristics such as gender or alleged race, sug-
gest the need to provide protection against discrimination in the classic fashion, 
with strict scrutiny levels. 
The field will certainly develop further in rapid fashion, and also with 
upcoming constellations inviting such multidimensional analysis. For example, 
the pending reference in Henning, which questions the role of age-bands in 
managing collective redundancies,82 may well be a case in point. The under-
lying rules, decreed by works council agreement, award higher severance 
 payments to those with longer continuous employment – a group in which men 
82. Henning, cited supra note 3.
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are frequently overrepresented. Like the pending case Mai,83 this case also 
gives the opportunity to further specify case law on the relation of age dis-
crimination and fundamental rights to collective bargaining. 
The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is guaranteed to 
generate more controversial, and at the same time theoretically challenging 
case law. It is to be hoped that the cases where a strict scrutiny principle is 
applied and multiple grounds of discrimination are being considered will 
become more numerous over time than at present.
83. Mai, cited supra note 3.
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